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Articles
Finding the Blight That's Right




For over half a century federal and most state laws empowering
local governments to act as urban redevelopers have attempted to
confine such activity to blighted areas. Nowhere have the statutory
definitions of blight, and judicial enforcement of those standards,
been more restrictive than in California. In two recent cases,
Diamond Bar' and Mammoth Lakes2, appellate courts struck down
redevelopment proposals for crossing the blight line. This Article
describes those cases in light of the blight standard successfully
championed in Sacramento in 1993 by the pro-redevelopment lobby
to head off more restrictive legislation. Undercutting the tougher
definition was, predictably, spotty enforcement. In rejecting
administrative oversight at the state level, the legislature left ample
room for cities and counties to adopt redevelopment projects in
flagrant disregard of the 1993 law. Some cities and counties have
done so and have gotten away with it.
This Article describes the evolution of the blight standard, then
concludes that the definition of blight ought to be relaxed to
* Florine and Ervin Yoder Professor of Real Estate Law, University of Southern
California. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Tim Becker and
Max Sloves, the editing of Bill Givens, and the guidance of Ed Barkett, Ed Edelman,
Susan Georgino, Cal Hollis, Michael Jenkins, Murray Kane, and Jeff Skorneck.
1. Beach-Courchesne v. City of Diamond Bar, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265 (Ct. App. 2000).
2. Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redevelopment Agency, 98
Cal. Rptr. 2d 334 (Ct. App. 2000).
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accommodate redevelopment projects undertaken to achieve sound
planning objectives of the sort mandated by state planning legislation.
In this way, local governments won't have to risk defying the law and
playing development litigation roulette as a pre-condition to using
redevelopment powers to improve their communities. More than
ever, broad redevelopment powers can be useful in the revival of
some declining inner suburbs built thirty to fifty years ago and
instrumental, as well, in coaxing higher densities of development into
the cores of rapidly expanding areas to slowdown "sprawl," facilitate
the use of public transport, and reduce infrastructure costs.
I. The Origin of the Blight Requirement in Federal
Redevelopment Law
Proponents of the first federal urban redevelopment law3 were
concerned that federal courts might declare redevelopment
unconstitutional for violating the Fifth Amendment's implicit
requirement that private property be taken only for a public use
("nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation"4). Most redevelopment projects seemed vulnerable to
"public use" attacks because they involved the condemnation of
private property for eventual sale or lease to another private owner.
To qualify these takings of private property as public uses,
proponents sought to justify redevelopment in the well-established
police power prerogatives of state and local governments, relying
particularly on their unquestioned authority to safeguard "health and
safety." Blight removal brought redevelopment well within the ambit
of "health and safety" since policy makers at that time were
convinced that overcrowding in low income areas contributed to the
spread of disease and crime. Because government programs to
achieve health and safety goals clearly qualified as a public uses
3. The federal redevelopment law was enacted, and early redevelopment projects
fostered, largely through the efforts of a coalition of central city business and industrial
leaders (predominantly Republicans) and big city mayors (often Democrats). See
ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOvERNs? 115-40 (1961). The statute is Housing Act of 1949,
ch. 338, § 105(a), 63 Stat. 413, 416-17 (1949) (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1460
(1988)), omitted by Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
383,88 Stat. 633, 652 (1974).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936) (upholding
condemnation of private property for public housing on the theory that eliminating the
"inherent evil" of slums constituted a public use). This opinion presaged the "public use"
rationale, which the Berman court ultimately adopted, that if a menace was serious
enough to justify government action at all, and the government action taken was
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condemnation incidental to such programs would pass constitutional
muster as well. By tying the legitimacy of redevelopment to slum
clearance or blight removal,6 courts extended only slightly the power
local governments had long possessed to demolish dangerously
dilapidated housing upon the neglect or refusal of private owners to
do so.7
When the constitutionality of using eminent domain for
redevelopment reached the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1954
landmark case of Berman v. Parker,8 these constitutional worries
proved needless9 and the "blight" requirement became redundant. In
Berman, the Supreme Court eliminated any meaningful judicial
review of government programs challenged solely on public use
grounds. "Public use" would henceforth be taken to mean nothing
more than "coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police
powers."'10 After Berman v. Parker, federal courts have never
rejected a condemnation of private property for want of a public use,
nor have most state courts." When petitioned to strike down a
redevelopment scheme for lacking the requisite "public use," federal
courts decline to second-guess local legislative definitions of blight
and don't insist blight be present to justify a redevelopment taking.
12
A few state courts have imposed stringent "public use" tests, invoking
reasonably calculated to attack the menace, it was constitutionally immaterial whether the
government deployed its powers of taxation, police power, or eminent domain.
6. In current everyday usage, "slums" and "blighted areas" are often treated as
synonyms. But from Justice Douglas' opinion in Berman v. Parker, it appears that slums
were regarded as worse than blighted areas: "We think the standards prescribed were
adequate for executing the plan to eliminate not only slums as narrowly defined by the
District Court but also the blighted areas that tend to produce slums." 348 U.S. 26, 35
(1954).
7. Central Say. Bank v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.S.2d 451 (App. Div. 1938)
(upholding law entitling city to lien apartment houses for making needed repairs which the
owner failed to make).
8. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
9. See supra notes 4-5.
10. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,240 (1984).
11. In a study of all state and federal "public use" cases decided since 1954, all federal
cases found for public use, as did 85% of all state cases. Thomas W. Merrill, The
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986).
12. See, e.g., Guam v. Moylan, 407 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that
condemnation as part of renewal program to facilitate re-plating of Agana, Guam, to
"bring order out of chaos" constituted a public purpose regardless of whether Agana was
blighted). Most courts uphold the use of redevelopment powers, including eminent
domain, to advance economic development objectives even in areas that are manifestly
not blighted. Daniel R. Mandelker, Public Entrepreneurship: A Legal Primer, 15 REAL
EST. L.J. 3, 8-9 (1986).
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provisions of their respective state constitutions.13 But most state
courts have followed the federal lead and uniformly rejected "public
use" challenges to redevelopment laws whether based on federal or
state constitutional provisions.
Under the federal redevelopment statute, Congress could have
created a private right of action empowering citizens to challenge
"blight" findings as a pre-condition to federal funding. But Congress
did not. Instead, although the statute specified that federal funds
were to be used only for a "slum area or a blighted, deteriorated, or
deteriorating area," it explicitly left to the federal administrator any
determination of whether an area qualified.14 Congress implicitly
expanded the administrator's discretion in the 1954 amendments to
the original 1949 legislation. Instead of reserving renewal funds for
areas so bad that blight could only be eliminated by massive
demolition (slum clearance), the 1954 Act encouraged conservation
and rehabilitation of declining areas before they became blighted to
prevent their becoming so.15 In addition, the federal urban renewal
administrator deferred to the blight determinations of local renewal
directors since strict adherence to federal regulations targeting the
most unlivable areas for clearance conflicted with other rules
mandating the re-building of cleared sites to be carried out by private
developers. City renewal directors quickly learned there was no
realistic chance that private builders could be drawn to developing
commercial projects in hopelessly blighted areas.16
As city renewal directors came to accept the fact that private
developers had no capacity to re-build in the worst parts of cities,
13. See, e.g., Mayor & Aldermen of Vicksburg v. Thomas, 645 So. 2d 940 (Miss. 1994)
(holding that redevelopment agency failed to establish public use in attempted
condemnation of private property for conveyance to Harrah's for land based river boat
gaming because redevelopment plan detailed no specific use); Casino Reinvestment Dev.
Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102, 104 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998) (Attempt by
redevelopment agency to condemn private land for future expansion of Trump Casino
Court held not a public purpose because agency specified no time period within which
development had to occur. In New Jersey, public purpose "may turn upon an assessment
of the consequences and effects of the proposed project." Without a detailed, time-bound
development plan such an assessment would be conjectural at best.).
14. The administrator was given absolute discretion to determine whether an area was
"appropriate for an urban renewal project." Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 110, 63 Stat.
413, 420-21 (1949) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1967)).
15. See generally Charles J. Orlebeke, The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Policy,
1949 to 1999, 11 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 489 (2000); Ashley A. Foard & Hilbert
Fefferman, Federal Urban Renewal Legislation, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND
THE CONTROVERSY 96 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966).
16. BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC. How
AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 23 (1990).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52
CALIFORNIA REDEVELOPMENT LAW
they searched for "the blight that's right" -places just bad enough to
clear but good enough to attract developers. 17 When program
administrators couldn't legitimately find blight in areas with good
prospects for redevelopment, they fabricated it. Under the leadership
of Robert Moses, 18 a majority of early renewal funds were spent in
New York City,19 and New York City set the precedent of designating
redevelopment sites for acquisition and clearance that were not
blighted by any reasonable definition. 20 New York courts refused to
intervene, following the lead of the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court opinion
in Berman v. Parker.
21
II. The Emergence of Locally Financed Redevelopment
Through Tax Increment Financing (TIF)
Although the federal redevelopment program ended in 1974,22
California, forty-four other states, and the District of Columbia,
23
17. Id.
18. See generally ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER (1974) (biography of
Robert Moses, who held unprecedented authority over public works in New York City for
decades).
19. Ian S. Tattenbaum, Note, Renewal for the 1990s: An Analysis of New York City
Redevelopment Programs in Light of Title I of the Housing Act of 1949, 6 N.Y.U. ENvTL.
LJ. 220,230 (1997).
20. Id-
21. Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659 (N.Y. 1953); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAWS § 970-C
(McKinney 1999).
22. The elimination of urban renewal accompanied the Nixon Administration's
housing subsidy reforms. Orlebeke, supra note 15, at 500-01.
23. ALA. CODE § 11-99-2 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 29.47.460 (Michie 2000); ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN § 36-1471 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-203
(Michie 1998); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33670 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 31-25-107 (West 1990 & Supp. 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-485 (West
1999); FLA. STA. ANN § 163.335 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-44-20 (2000); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-103 (Michie 1993); IDAHO CODE § 50-2008 (Michie 2000); 65 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-74.4-2 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-26-25 (West 1997);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 403.2 (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1770 (Supp. 2000); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.491 (Michie Supp. 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9032 (West 1998
& Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30 § 5203 (West 1998); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41,
§ 14-206 (1997); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. chap. 23A, § 3E (West 1994); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 207.655 (1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.012 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-45-11 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 99.810 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-15-4301 (2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-2147 (1997); NEV. STAT.
ANN. § 279.676 (Michie 1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 162-K:8 (1994 & Supp. 2000);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-46-35 (Michie 1978); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-o (McKinney
1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-58-20 (Supp 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 725.07 (West
1994); 62 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 861 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 457.420
(1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 6930.2(A)(3) (West 1997); RI. GEN. LAWS § 45-33.2-3(7)
(1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-33-20(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
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continue to authorize redevelopment funded by tax increment
financing (TIF), which allows redevelopment agencies to receive and
spend the property taxes derived each year from increased assessed
values in the redevelopment project area. Redevelopment activity is
supposed to be self-financed from the increased property tax revenue
it produces. Tax increment financing was first used as a means for
cities to meet their matching share to qualify for grants under the
federal renewal program.24 It has since become the primary means of
local governments financing redevelopment on their own35
A. The Allocation of TIF
Under TIF, any increase in property taxes collected in the
redevelopment project area is reserved to pay redevelopment
expenses. Redevelopment agencies obtain capital by borrowing
against future tax increments. Until the redevelopment bondholders
and other redevelopment creditors are repaid, tax increases that
would have been shared by the city with other taxing entities-school
districts, counties, and special districts- are siphoned into repayment
of redevelopment agency obligations.26 The other taxing entities
continue receiving a share of property tax revenues from the
redevelopment project area based on pre-redevelopment assessed
valuations. But they forfeit revenues from the enhanced tax base
§ 11-9-2(3) (Michie 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-205(a) (1999); TEX. Loc. GOV'T.
CODE ANN. § 374.032 (1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-2-1247 (Supp. 2000); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 1893 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3245.2 (Michie 2000); W. VA. CODE
§ 7-11B-4 (Michie 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.1105 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000). The
states without TIF, as far as we could tell, were Delaware, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Washington, and Wyoming.
24. Eugene B. Jacobs & Jack G. Levine, Redevelopment: Making Misused and
Disused Land Available and Useable, 8 HASTINGS L.J. 241,262-63 (1957).
25. STATE OF CA CONTROLLER, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMUNrrY
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998-99 at ix (2000), available at
http:llwww.sco.ca.gov/ardllocalllocrep/redevelop/98-99/ [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].
About 40% of agency revenue comes from taxes. The next most important sources of
revenue are proceeds of long-term indebtedness (18.7%) and proceeds of refunding bonds
(18.4%).
26. In California, redevelopment agencies can retain tax increments only for
repayment of obligations. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33670(b) (West 1999).
Obligations include loans and advances from the city or county, tax allocation bonds,
lease-purchase agreements, reimbursement agreements with the city or county, disposition
and development agreements with the city, county or outside developers, owner
participation agreements, bank loans, and any contracts that could result in damage or
other liabilities for breach. Marek v. Napa Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 761 P.2d 701,
251 (Cal. 1988) (holding that redevelopment agency's executory financial obligation under
DDA counted as "indebtedness" under Community Redevelopment Law, entitling agency
to honor contract by using tax increment funds for it).
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until the redevelopment bonds are paid, usually a period of 20 to 40
years.27
Other taxing entities are expected to benefit from redevelopment
reviving dormant or declining property tax bases. Once an area is
successfully redeveloped, the theory goes, other tax entities should
experience reduced public service costs associated with lower crime
rates, higher employment, and fewer injuries and illnesses due to
intolerable housing conditions and poverty. To the extent that
redevelopment stimulates activity outside the project boundary, all
the increased property tax goes to the other taxing entities since the
redevelopment agency has no claim to taxes generated outside the
project area.
The efficiency justification for TIF is weakened when the project
would have been built anyway somewhere within the boundaries of
the school district or county. Redevelopment proponents admit this
possibility but contend that without their efforts poor areas would
continue deteriorating while rich areas prosper.
Many state statutes, including California's, describe
redevelopment as a last resort, only appropriate to alleviate the
conditions of blight "which cannot reasonably be expected to be
reversed or alleviated by private enterprise or governmental action,
or both, without redevelopment."8 Yet, much of the tax increment in
redevelopment areas appears to come from projects built entirely
independent of the redevelopment effort. For instance, a 1998 study
compared thirty-eight redevelopment project areas and thirty-eight
similar urban districts in three California counties. It concluded that
although redevelopment does seem to stimulate a disproportionate
increase in assessed property value, the increment only covered an
estimated 51% of the tax increment revenues the counties received in
fiscal year 1994-1995. The rest of the tax increment subsidy to
redevelopment agencies came from property value increases that
were likely to have occurred in any event.29 Unfortunately, the study
is seriously flawed, but it is the most comprehensive effort
undertaken to date to assess whether tax increment funded
redevelopment truly pays its own way.
30
27. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33333.6 (West 1999).
28. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33030(b)(1) (West 1999).
29. MICHAEL DARDIA, SUBSIDIZING REDEVELOPMENT IN CALIFORNIA xiii (Public
Policy Institute of California 1998).
30. Cal Hollis mentions one methodology problem: residential census data were used
to select control areas even though patently inapplicable to many of the paired commercial
redevelopment areas. Email from Cal Hollis (Dec. 20,2000) (on file with author).
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B. The Fiscal Impact of TIF on Cities, Counties, and School Districts
In general, cities with active redevelopment agencies are the
main TIF winners, and counties3' and the state are the primary TIF
losers. These losses would be offset, though, to the extent
redevelopment activity increases jobs, incomes, and retail sales, all of
which spawn fiscal benefits to the state or counties through increased
business, income, property, and sales taxes. Such secondary benefits
offset state and county losses from TIF. Although most observers
would concede that redevelopment, starting with the Bunker Hill
project, has changed the face of downtown Los Angeles, it would be
difficult to assess how much of that development would eventually
have been built elsewhere within Los Angeles county in the absence
of redevelopment. Similarly, it is difficult to know how much of the
development in Yerba Buena, South of Market, Diamond Heights, or
Western Addition would have occurred there or elsewhere in San
Francisco without redevelopment.
Regardless of the impacts on other taxing entities, the use of tax
increment financing has proven irresistibly attractive to California's
cities and counties short of cash and looking for added revenues.
32
Statewide, redevelopment agencies have more than tripled their
property tax revenues from about half a billion dollars in 1985-86 to
nearly $1.8 billion in 1998-99.33 TIF-based redevelopment projects
are not limited to California's biggest and oldest cities. Four-fifths of
California's 472 cities had authorized the creation of a redevelopment
agency by 1998-99, and in cities with populations exceeding 50,001,
over 90% of those agencies are actively working on projects.34
When California cities divert funds from counties, they
jeopardize counties' abilities to provide vital services. Formally,
31. Except for the coterminous City and County of San Francisco, counties risk losing
property tax revenue through city-formed redevelopment areas located within the county.
32. The state has never managed to dedicate revenue sources for local governments
sufficient to cover the gap left by Proposition 13, or returned property tax revenues the
state siphoned from local governments to cover the state deficit during the recession years
of the early 1990s.
33. The California Redevelopment Association compiled these numbers from the
State Controller's Community Redevelopment Agencies Annual Report. The actual
numbers are $531,838,652 in 1985-86 to $1,761,991,000 in 1998-99.
34. Of the 25 inactive agencies, 84% were in cities with populations of fewer than
25,001. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 25, at xx. To students of the history of
redevelopment, there is nothing surprising in the widespread use of redevelopment by
smaller communities. For instance, by 1964, 70% of the 800 cities carrying out 1600
federally-assisted urban renewal projects had populations of less than 50,000. LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION 170
(1968).
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counties are administrative units of state government. But counties
have substantial responsibility as providers of last resort for welfare,
indigent health care, roads, tax collection, the court system, and
sanitation. Counties also provide a full range of municipal services
for residents in unincorporated areas, and to smaller cities by
contract. Redevelopment agencies have cut sizably into property tax
revenues that would otherwise have been distributed to the county
and other taxing entities. During fiscal year 1998-99, for instance, Los
Angeles County received 19% of property tax revenues while schools
received 37%, cities 18%, redevelopment agencies 8%, with the
balance going to numerous special districts.35  That 8%-over
$500,000,000-would have been available for schools and county
services had there been no TIF, assuming that all of these projects
would have been built somewhere in the county even without
redevelopment.
The impact of TIF on California schools depends entirely on the
state's fiscal decisions. The state constitution allocates a large portion
of state revenue to education 36 to make sure disparities in property
tax bases do not result in unequal education spending per pupil.37
Thus, where cities and counties shift property taxes from schools to
redevelopment projects, the state must make up the difference-
though not necessarily out of taxes it has levied directly. The state
has the option of filling its fiscal holes by dipping into redevelopment
35. LOS ANGELES COUNTY, TAXPAYER'S GUIDE FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998-99.
36. Proposition 98 (1988) and Proposition 111 (1990) provide a minimum funding
guarantee for school districts, community college districts, and other state agencies
offering direct K-14 instruction. According to a formula specified in these initiatives,
based on cost-of-living, population, local property tax proceeds, and other factors, the
state is obligated to spend a certain portion of its revenues on education. In the most
recent fiscal year, for instance, for every $100,000,000 increase in the state General Fund,
$60,000,000 would have to be spent on education. CA DEPT. OF FINANCE, BUDGET
FAQS, available at http://www.dof.ca.govlhtmllbud docs/question.htm (last visited Mar.
12,2001).
37. California courts held in the 1970s that the state's equal protection clause
precluded sole reliance on the property tax for school funding because of tax base
disparities among school districts. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 950 (Cal. 1976). A
study of school spending in five of the six states imposing equality norms showed mixed
results. Disparities between rich and poor school districts narrowed somewhat while such
disparities remained unchanged elsewhere in the nation. But per pupil expenditures in
four of the five states grew at rates below the national average. Bradley W. Joondeph,
The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly: An Empirical Analysis of Litigation-Prompted School
Finance Reform, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763 (1995).
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and county property tax revenues to finance schools, an option it
exercised when the state was running at a deficit from 1992 to 1994.38
Until 1993, counties and school districts possessed a right to fiscal
review and protest of redevelopment proposals which they sometimes
used to extract concessions from redevelopment agencies regardless
of a project's intrinsic merit.39 Those concessions usually took the
form of redevelopment agency agreements to relinquish a piece of the
increment to the protesting entity.40 In 1993, the state legislature
replaced the protest statute with a law directing redevelopment
agencies to pay affected taxing entities a fixed share of the increment
but no more. These sums are more modest than the deals some
school districts and counties were negotiating for themselves in
exchange for waiving their now repealed right of protest.41
The legislature hoped counties would review city redevelopment
proposals more critically after the state outlawed "sweetheart" deals
between redevelopment agencies and counties.42 To encourage
scrutiny of new TIEF-based redevelopment projects, state law requires
redevelopment agencies to prepare a preliminary report for the other
affected taxing entities.43 In that report, the agency is required to
38. Payments were made to the Educational Revenue Augmentation Fund (ERAF).
BEATTY, COOMES, JR., ET AL, REDEVELOPMENT IN CALIFORNIA 196-98 (2d ed. 1995).
CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 33681 (West 1999). See County of Sonoma v.
Comm'n on State Mandates, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784 (Ct. App. 2000) (Court upheld the right
of the state to shift property tax revenues to education without making up the revenue loss
to the counties. Education was not a program funded entirely by the state before the
enactment of the constitutional amendment requiring the state to fund new programs it
imposed upon local governments.).
39. "The Legislature finds and declares.., negotiated agreements between
redevelopment agencies and counties ... often led to redevelopment project areas that
were not truly blighted...." A.B. 1424, 1995-96 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995).
40. See, e.g., Meany v. Sacramento Hous. & Redevelopment Agency, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d
589 (Ct. App. 1993) (school district challenged redevelopment agency's agreement with
county to set aside from the tax increment the amount the county would have received in
property taxes from the project area for construction of a new county courthouse).
41. For instance, less than a month before the anti-pass through law became effective,
the City of San Jacinto and the City of Los Angeles signed pass through agreements giving
their counties 20 to 50% more revenue than they otherwise would have received from
redevelopment project areas. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, REPORT ON
REDEVELOPMENT AFTER REFORM: A PRELIMINARY LOOK 6-7 (1994), available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/redevelopmenLafterreform.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2001)
[hereinafter PRELIMINARY LOOK].
42. As the Legislative Analyst explained: "Local taxing agencies, therefore, will have
a greater fiscal interest to review the merits of a proposed redevelopment plan." Id at 11.
The legislative goal may not have been achieved because few redevelopment projects are
ever challenged by anyone, and the mandated remuneration for counties in itself
discourages county challenges.
43. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33344.5 (West 1999).
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describe both the specific projects proposed and the ways in which
those projects "will improve or alleviate" the physical and economic
blighting conditions cited in the preliminary report.44
Counties and school districts still have the opportunity to extract
"hold out" contributions from city redevelopment agencies. Affected
taxing entities are empowered to launch or join legal challenges to
redevelopment projects for violating blight and other statutory
requisites. 45 To placate counties, determined city and redevelopment
officials find ways to avoid the anti-pass through statute.46 For
instance, a city redevelopment agency could agree to construct public
facilities such as police or fire stations47 that the county would
otherwise have had to build to serve unincorporated areas or
"contract" cities.48 The 1993 anti-pass through statute imposed no
ceiling on the value of infrastructure cities could pass through to
counties. 49
C. State Mandated Affordable Housing and Relocation Assistance
The right to utilize tax increments doesn't come free to cities and
counties from the state legislature. Responding to years of criticism
that redevelopment destroyed more affordable housing than it built,50
44. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33344.5 (e)-(f) (West 1999).
45. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae Del Norte County et al., Friends of Mammoth v.
Town of Mammoth Lakes Redevelopment Agency, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334 (Ct. App. 2000)
(No. C031043).
46. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33607.5(f)(1)(B)(2) (West 1999).
47. The Mammoth Lakes case can be viewed as an example of a city offering a county
more than it could refuse. According to the Appellant's Opening Brief at 8 n.11, Friends
of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redevelopment Agency, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334
(Ct. App. 2000) (No. 031043):
[Tihe Redevelopment Plan authorizes creation of a community library at the
estimated cost of $200,000, construction of a performing arts theater in
conjunction with the local Community College at an estimated cost of $3 million,
construction of school facilities enhancements including a gymnasium and an
aquatics center at a total cost of $5 million, construction of improvements at
Mammoth Hospital at a cost of $410,000, miscellaneous improvements to
increase water capacity at a cost of $2.9 million, miscellaneous utilities
improvements at a combined cost of $7,550,000. As a result, these taxing entities
entered into cooperation agreements with the Town and not surprisingly
expressed support for the Redevelopment Plan.
48. In California, cities have the option of contracting with counties for public services
such as libraries, police, and fire.
49. PRELIMINARY LOOK, supra note 41, at 10.
50. A 1984 survey found that redevelopment projects had increased the supply of
housing for market rate and low income units but decreased the supply of very low income
units. CA DEBT ADVISORY COMMISSION, USE OF REDEVELOPMENT AND TAX
INCREMENT FINANCING (1984).
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the California legislature now requires one-for-one replacement of all
affordable housing units destroyed by redevelopment. 51 Further, the
state requires redevelopment agencies to spend 20% of the tax
increment for affordable housing52-$275,000,000 in 1998-99.
53
Utilizing the mandated 20% "set aside," redevelopment agencies
assisted about 80,000 affordable housing units over the last four
years,54 and are a major source of direct housing subsidies in
California. But for the fact that redevelopment is funded by TIF, the
state would probably lack authority under the California constitution
to impose such an obligation.
55
In addition to the constitutional mandate to pay "just
compensation" for property taken, redevelopment agencies have a
financial obligation to make relocation payments to the residents and
businesses they displace.56 At a minimum, residents and businesses
are entitled by statute to moving costs when ordered out following
redevelopment agency acquisition of their homes or places of
business.57 In addition, residents are eligible to receive for up to
51. Redevelopment plans contemplating the destruction or removal of dwellings units
from the low and moderate income housing stock must promulgate a replacement housing
plan within 30 days prior to executing any agreement that could lead to loss of housing
units. The plan must show replacement on a one-for-one basis. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 33413.5 (West 1999). For units destroyed or removed after September 1,1989 as a
result of agency action, 75% of the replacement units must be affordable to individuals
with the same income levels as had occupied the housing destroyed or removed. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33413(a) (West 1999).
52. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33334.2,33334.3 (West 1999).
53. Chart prepared by California Redevelopment Association from State Controller's
Community Redevelopment Agencies Annual Report (on file with author).
54. Id.
55. The state is not supposed to mandate local governments to use tax proceeds for
new programs or higher levels of service without making reimbursement in full according
to CA CONST. art. XIIIB, § 6. The idea was to prevent state officials from reaping
political gains during the taxpayer revolts of the late 1970s by shifting the state's own
program responsibilities to local governments so that they would have to take the heat for
raising taxes. In Redevelopment Agency v. Commission on State Mandates, 64 Cal. Rptr.
2d 270 (Ct. App. 1997), a California appellate court upheld a determination by the
California Commission on State Mandates that redevelopment agencies don't spend
"proceeds of taxes." Nor do they raise "general revenues for the local entity." Further,
the state isn't transferring the cost of a state program because the affordable housing
subsidy requirement doesn't displace a prior state program.
56. Section 6038, State Guidelines, requires agencies to prepare specific and detailed
relocation plans, to be submitted to the State Department of Housing and Community
Development 30 days prior to submission to the local legislative body for approval.
BEATTY, supra note 38, at 110.
57. Id. at 113-14 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7260(c)(3)(B)(ii) (West 1995 & Supp.
2001)). Agencies are also obligated to make relocation payments to those who are
displaced "as a result of an owner participation agreement or an acquisition carried out by
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forty-two months replacement housing payments equal to the
difference between the lesser of existing rent or 30 percent of the
tenant's income and the cost of renting comparable housing.
58
Businesses employing 500 or fewer employees can receive
compensation up to $20,000 upon convincing the agency that they
cannot be relocated without substantial loss of patronage.59
III.The Practical and Policy Limits of the Blight Requirement
A. The Inherent Contradiction Between Reliance on TIF and Blight
Removal
Despite formal legal requirements, there is usually only a weak
connection between an area's TIF potential and its blight. A
redevelopment agency with a strong survival instinct needs to
produce tax increments starting in the year after the redevelopment
project boundaries are set. Otherwise, redevelopment agency
employees must be paid from local general funds. Instead of running
a profit center which enhances the local tax base, redevelopment
agencies would become just another public agency vying for an
appropriation. To succeed in California, a redevelopment agency
depends on there being new construction or a change in ownership
within project area boundaries since California's property tax regime
allows for assessments to current market value only upon a change in
ownership or new construction.60
The ideal site for the production of a big tax increment is either
vacant when declared a redevelopment project area or easily
cleared. 61 It must also be a site upon which private redevelopers are
a private person for or in connection with a public use, where the public entity is otherwise
empowered to acquire the property to carry out the public use."
58. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7260(i)(3) (West 1995 & Supp. 2001).
59. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7262(c) (West 1995).
60. After the enactment of Proposition 13, the tax base was frozen and could only be
increased 2% a year for inflation, and upon new construction or a change in ownership.
CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(b). For plans adopted before January 1, 1994, the other
taxing entities were entitled to receive their proportionate share of the two percent annual
increase. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33676 (West 1999). Also, when voters
approve bonded indebtedness for other taxing entities, those entities are entitled to the tax
increment attributable to the increased tax rate. CAL. CONsT. art. XVI, § 16.
61. The state legislature recognized the irresistible attraction for redevelopment
agencies to lure big, tax-generating uses to vacant sites, blighted or not. To remove this
temptation, the legislature banned automobile dealerships in redevelopment project areas
from being located on land never previously developed for urban uses. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 33426.5(a) (West 1999). The legislature also banned development that
would generate sales taxes from being located on a parcel of land five acres or larger,
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ready to build immediately. This usually precludes redevelopment of
the most crime-ridden and poverty-stricken sites in town because
there is simply no alternate market for them. Densely built, rundown
areas filled with marginal businesses and low income residents are
only good candidates for TIF-funded redevelopment if located where
there is strong potential demand for "higher and better" uses. Even
then, the arduous, often contentious task of clearing heavily
populated areas is expensive, takes time, and absorbs political capital
as well. It is not surprising, then, that commercial and industrial
projects outnumber residential by about two-to-one, or that new
construction outpaces rehabilitation by a margin of about eight-to-
one.
62
Cities and counties hope to ensure the requisite tax increments
by delineating project boundaries to encompass enormous areas,
hundreds or thousands of acres.63 In good times, such areas generate
increments automatically as owners embark upon new construction in
the normal course of business or homeownership. 64 Sometimes, land
developers who own large, vacant tracts work with redevelopment
agencies to offset infrastructure costs with subsidies taken from the
tax increment the project will yield.
The realities of TIF contradict the premise, embodied in many
state redevelopment enabling laws,65 that redevelopment powers
should be reserved exclusively for projects which private developers
wouldn't have built on their own. This premise is beside the point to
redevelopment officials single-mindedly following the money. For
this reason, a much favored strategy is to include within newly
established redevelopment project area boundaries major private
projects already scheduled for construction. Though patently illegal
because these projects would have been built even in the absence of
unless the principal permitted use was office, hotel, manufacturing, or industrial. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33426.5 (b) (West 1999).
62. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 25, at xxi, xxii.
63. Id. at xxi. Of 823 projects in 1998-99, 30% consisted of projects 101-500 acres, and
3% of projects 501-2500 acres.
64. Following the enactment of Proposition 13, which slashed property tax revenues,
new redevelopment project areas became larger. Project areas established before 1979
averaged 481 acres. Project areas established between 1978 and 1984 averaged 811 acres.
BEAT=Y, supra note 38, at 110.
65. E.g., ALA. CODE § 11-99-4(5)(a) (1975) ("it is not reasonable to anticipate that the
land in the district will be developed without the adoption of the project plan"); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 99.810(1) (West 1998) ("would not reasonably be anticipated to be developed
without the adoption of tax increment financing"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 6930.5(a)(6)(iv)(D) (West 1997) ("would not reasonably be anticipated to be adequately
developed or further developed without the adoption of the plan").
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redevelopment, 66 the ensuing tax increment jump-starts the rest of the
redevelopment effort.
In fairness, redevelopment activity is not inevitably a mad dash
for tax increments at any price. Many redevelopment projects
originate in blighted areas. Some projects contemplate spending the
tax increment garnered from successful commercial renewal projects
in upgrading declining residential areas. For instance, redevelopment
agencies arrange home improvement loans and fill big gaps in the
local infrastructure which contributed to neighborhood decline.67
Such projects upgrade residential areas without displacing residents
and almost always fall well within the statutory blight definition.
Even in close cases, courts tend to favor redevelopment agencies in
these neighborhood improvement situations.
68
B. Definitions of Blight Poorly Serve the Purposes Usually Ascribed to
Them
There are those who contend that an exacting definition of blight
should be required to validate the use of redevelopment because of
three extraordinary powers conferred upon redevelopment
agencies:69 (1) redevelopment diverts property taxes that otherwise
would have been allocated to other public agencies; (2)
66. E.g., Regus v. City of Baldwin Park, 139 Cal. Rptr. 196, 201-04 (Ct. App. 1977)
(striking down redevelopment project area formed to nurture retail and hotel uses, and
which combined two separate areas within one project, an area arguably blighted, and
another, totally devoid of blight characteristics, located one mile away across a freeway,
which contained parcels already acquired by United Parcel Service, Nichols Lumber, and
other private firms for imminent development); see also Leach v. City of San Marcos, 261
Cal. Rptr. 805, 810 (Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting agency's inclusion for the tax increment of
non-contiguous, non-blighted property about to be developed.).
67. E.g., Project of the Montv Clovis-Music Avenue Project, REDEVELOPMENT J.
Aug. 2000, at 4-5 (A neighborhood of modest rental homes and apartments was long
burdened by periodic flooding and with long, narrow lots with inaccessible back yards,
whose deep interiors were filled with debris, junked cars, and weeds. This project brought
new streets to service the rear portion of the lots so they could be subdivided, along with
storm drains, channeling a creek, and utilities among various housing subsidies.).
68. Nat'l City Bus. Ass'n v. City of Nat'l City, 194 Cal. Rptr. 707, 712-13 (Ct. App.
1983) ("Blight in the neighborhood improvement areas is a closer question .... the social
makeup of the area shows a need for redevelopment .... The propriety of inclusion of the
neighborhood improvement areas in the redevelopment plan is also supported by the
likelihood of continued deterioration of the areas absent redevelopment due to the low
incomes of the residents and the already faulty public improvements.").
69. These are listed as the extraordinary powers justifying the "ever-tightening
restriction of the definitions of blight [the jurisdictional basis for invoking
redevelopment]" in the Appellant's Opening Brief at 13 n.11, Friends of Mammoth v.
Town of Mammoth Lakes Redevelopment Agency, 98 Cal Rptr. 2d 334 (Ct. App. 2000)
(No. C031043).
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redevelopment agencies can use public funds to subsidize private
enterprise; (3) redevelolment agencies possess the power of eminent
domain. Of course, a project that is blocked because it was scheduled
for an unblighted area would not divert tax increment, result in an
unfair deal with private developers, or involve eminent domain. But
even a project located in an indisputably blighted area could call for
an unwarranted diversion of tax increment or lead to a bad deal for
the public agency. Both of these concerns are better addressed
directly rather than circuitously through definitions of blight.
(1) Blight Definitions as Budget Savers
When the state last tightened its blight standard in 1993, it was
struggling with rapidly declining state tax revenues. 70 The state
Department of Finance joined the effort to tighten the blight standard
as a way of limiting the loss of property tax revenues to school
districts and counties. While new tax increment climbed very slowly
in the first four years following the 1993 blight reformulation, and
bounded up sharply in the most recent fiscal year, it isn't easy to tell
whether any of this is attributable to the legislation. In those first
four years California was in the midst of its worst real estate recession
since the Great Depression. Assessed values are just now returning
to pre-1994 levels.71
In an ideal world, the state would limit redevelopment's
diversion of property tax revenues from counties and schools to the
present value of all benefits received by counties and schools from
redevelopment. Short of that, the state could protect county and
school tax revenue either by enacting a TIF cap72 or increasing the
share of the increment to which other taxing entities would become
automatically entitled.
70. In fiscal year 1991-1992, the state General Fund showed a negative balance of
approximately $3.3 billion, of $2.2 billion in 1992-93, and $1 billion in 1993-94. Annual
Reports of the State of California, Office of State at pages A-16, A14, and A-16,
respectively.
71. From 1993-94 to 1997-98, tax increment increased only 2.5% over the four year
period. In the 1998-99 fiscal year, tax increment revenues amounted to $1.8 billion, an
increase of 8.5% over the preceding fiscal year. But this was due in large part to the real
estate recovery. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 25, at viii.
72. South Dakota, for instance, limits local governments to including within tax
increment districts no more than ten percent of the total assessed value of taxable
property in the municipality. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11-9-7 (Michie 1995).
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(2) Blight Definitions to Limit Inter-Municipal Bidding Wars
Taxpayers are understandably chagrined when municipalities try
to lure private developers away from each other with tax dollars. The
temptation is always present and often proves irresistible when most
of the funding comes from taxing entities other than the one
extending the subsidy.
73
A California appellate court described the issue aptly decades
ago:
By misemploying the extraordinary powers of urban renewal a
redevelopment agency captures pending tax revenues which it can
then use as a grubstake to subsidize commercial development
within the project area in the hope of striking it rich. Such schemes
contemplate borrowing money by issuing bonds on the strength of
assured future tax revenues, money which is then used to acquire,
improve, and resell property within the project area at a loss as an
inducement to business enterprises ... to locate within the project
area rather than in neighboring communities. In essence, tax
revenues are used as subsidies to attract new business. The
immediate gainers are the subsidized businesses. The immediate
losers are the taxpayers and government entities outside the project
area, who are required to pay the normal running expenses of
government operation without the assistance of new tax revenues
from the project area.74
However, it makes no sense to rely on a definition of blight to
deter destructive competition among cities. There is no subsidy to
private developers inherent in tax increment financing. The owners
of private property are taxed on precisely the same basis whether
their properties lie within or outside of redevelopment project
boundaries. 5 Developers receive subsidies through the deals they
strike with redevelopment authorities. Whether a developer
negotiated too rich a deal for itself can only be determined by
scrutinizing the terms of the particular deal and does not depend on
73. "An observer of the California system has noted that while cities are in total
control of their redevelopment projects, their portion of property taxes collected is
generally less than one-quarter of the total tax collected. The remaining three-quarters
are captured by another taxing agency that has no control over the project. In other
words, cities using tax increment financing are free to gamble with the future tax bases of
other taxing entities within their purview." George Lefcoe, When Governments Become
Land Developers: Notes on the Public-Sector Experience in the Netherlands and
California, 51 So. CAL. L. REV. 165,258 (1978).
74. Regus v. City of Baldwin Park, 139 Cal. Rptr. 196,204-05 (Ct. App. 1977).
75. This is why tax increment financing is usually held not to violate the uniformity of
taxation provisions of state constitutions. See, e.g., Richards v. City of Muscatine, 237
N.W.2d 48, 61 (Iowa 1975).
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whether the site was truly blighted before the agency acquired it.
Under the current regime, courts seldom accept plaintiffs' invitations
to calculate whether the government got fair value in its dealings with
private developers, as long as there was some quid pro quo.
76
The best way for cities to avoid being short-changed is by hiring
as financial advisors competent staff and consultants, and accepting
their advice. It isn't easy for public officials to hang tough when
critics are complaining that the redevelopment site has remained
vacant far too long, the next election is imminent, and the city has
committed itself to a developer who demands too much.
Nonetheless, a city's best protection against bad deals is best sought
not in definitions of blight but at the bargaining table.
(3) Blight Definitions as Curbs on the Use of Condemnation Powers
The use of eminent domain for redevelopment has always been
controversial.77 Many redevelopment plans eschew the use of eminent
domain to calm homeowners' fears of displacement. But local
governments should be prepared to pay a premium for properties
acquired without the threat of eminent domain. Ever since Berman,
the courts have rejected the notion that a property owner could halt a
redevelopment project because it involves taking private property
from one owner for transfer to another. Yet, restrictive definitions of
blight endow property owners with a de facto veto of some
redevelopment projects, enabling them to extract far more than "just
compensation" in negotiating sales of their properties to
redevelopment agencies.
76. See Joshua P. Rubin, Note, Take the Money and Stay: Industrial Location
Incentives and Relational Contracting, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1277 (1995); Charter Township
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 559-60 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (GM closed a plant
after pocketing substantial tax abatements that the township had granted GM for job
retention and creation. Appellate court held the plant closing justified no cause of action
because GM had never made a promise of continued employment.); Adam M. Lett, Note,
Tax Abatements and Promissory Estoppel: A Match Not Made in Ypsilanti, 44 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1301, 1332-33 (1995).
77. "Suppose that the government decided that jalopies were a menace to public
safety and a blight on the beauty of our highways, and therefore took them away from
their drivers. Suppose, then, that to replenish the supply of automobiles, it gave these
drivers a hundred dollars each to buy a good used car and also made special grants to
General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler to lower the cost-although not necessarily the
price-of Cadillacs, Lincolns, and Imperials by a few hundred dollars. Absurd as this may
sound, change the jalopies into slum housing, and I have described, with only slight poetic
license, the first fifteen years of a federal program called urban renewal." Herbert J.
Gans, The Failure of Urban Renewal, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE
CONTROVERSY 537 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966).
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IV.Defining Blight
A. The 1993 California Legislation Redefining Blight
Redevelopment law was made more restrictive in 1993.78
Changes were made pertinent to findings of blight in order to cut
back on the use of redevelopment in unbuilt or vacant areas.79 The
full text of those statutes is reprinted in the appendix. Although prior
law confined redevelopment to predominantly urban areas, the
changes tightened the definition of "predominantly urban" to
preclude cities from establishing new project areas except in areas
surrounded by urban uses.80 Blight within the project area must be so
substantial and pervasive it burdens, physically and economically,
other parts of the community outside the project area.8' Also,
findings of blight are to be supported by at least one physical as well
as one economic blighting condition listed in the statute.82 Prior law
had only required proof of physical, economic, or social conditions.
83
In the 1993 law, the four indicia of physical blight are listed as:
(1) Buildings unsafe or unhealthy for persons to live or work in.84 (2)
Factors preventing or hindering economically viable use, caused by
substandard design, inadequate size given present standards and
market conditions, lack of parking, or other similar factors.85 (3)
Incompatible adjacent uses which prevent economic development of
the affected parcels. 86 (4) Lots made undevelopable or useless due to
their irregular form and shape, inadequate size or their being held in
multiple ownership.87 The statute declares this fourth physical
blighting condition sufficient standing alone to justify a finding of
blight.
78. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33031 (West 1999).
79. The legislative history shows that the League of California Cities and the
California Redevelopment Association (CRA) were among those supporting the
legislation. Leading the opposition were the California State Association of Counties, the
California Firefighters, and the Association of California Water Agencies. The CRA
sponsored the bill (1290), citing project areas that never end, project areas that contain too
much vacant land, project areas that involve the construction of a locality's administration
buildings, projects that give major retailers subsidies from tax dollars, and project areas
that contain a significant amount of unspent housing funds. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 942.
80. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33320.1.
81. Id. at § 33031(a)(2).
82. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33031.
83. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33030 (repealed 1993).
84. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33031(a)(1).
85. Id at § 33031(a)(2).
86. I& at § 33031(a)(3).
87. Id at § 33031(a)(4).
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Five economic blighting conditions are listed in the statute: (1)
stagnant property values, (2) in developed urban areas, abnormally
high vacancies, or vacant or abandoned lots, (3) a lack of necessary
commercial facilities (grocery or drug stores, banks), (4) residential
overcrowding or an excess of liquor stores, bars, or "adult"
businesses, leading to safety or welfare problems, or (5) high crime
rates.88
With minor changes in wording, these conditions were carried
forward from earlier redevelopment statutes and regrouped under
two headings (physical or economic) instead of three (physical,
economic, social). The only former blighting condition omitted in
1993 referenced "ill health, transmission of disease, infant mortality,
and juvenile delinquency."
B. The Standard of Judicial Review for Local Findings of Blight
State courts have selected among five standards for reviewing
municipal findings of blight. (1) The most frequent test used by
reviewing courts is whether the administrative determination was
arbitrary and capricious-made without any evidentiary support.8 9
(2) Under the next most commonly used test, courts will only
overturn local findings of blight for "fraud, bad faith, abuse of
discretion."90 (3) In California, based solely on the administrative
record, courts will overturn a local government's finding of blight, or
a trial court's affirmation of such a finding, for want of substantial
evidence supporting the decision.91 (4) In selecting any of the
standards just mentioned, courts are rejecting the independent
judgment test by which the court substitutes its view of the facts for
that of municipal decision-makers. (5) A few jurisdictions have
closed the door almost entirely to the usual run of challenges to
redevelopment agency resolutions.92 California has done this with
regard to findings of necessity made by government agencies to justify
eminent domain.93
While all California courts claim to apply the substantial
evidence test in blight challenges, a close examination of the cases
shows a range of approaches. Courts writing some opinions seem to
88. Id. at § 33031(b)(1)-(5).
89. E.g., Miller v. City of Tacoma, 378 P.2d 464,474-75 (Wash. 1963).
90. Urban Renewal Agency v. Decker, 415 P.2d 373,377 (Kan. 1966).
91. Fosselman's, Inc. v. City of Alhambra, 224 Cal. Rptr. 361,363-64 (Ct. App. 1986).
92. Allen v. City Council, 113 S.E.2d 621, 623-24 (Ga. 1960) (based on wording of a
state constitutional amendment).
93. People v. Chevalier, 340 P.2d 598, 603 (Cal. 1959).
:HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL1010 [Vol. 52
have been leaning towards the permissive "abuse of discretion"
standard. 94 Other opinions tilt in the opposite direction, nearly
touching the "independent judgment" test.95  Decades of
overreaching by redevelopment agencies have led some courts to
scrutinize blight claims with deep skepticism,96 as amply evidenced in
the Diamond Bar and Mammoth Lake opinions.97
V. The Recent California "Blight" Cases Applying the 1993
Statute
A. The Diamond Bar Case
(1) Diamond Bar Depicted
Diamond Bar is an affluent community, mostly residential, at the
southeastern border of Los Angeles County, "with a median income
of about $66,000, average home prices of $300,000, and a relatively
low crime rate."98 The city incorporated in 1989, mainly to exercise
greater control over land use decisions previously made by the county
government.99 To the casual visitor, this newly-built suburban,
94. Morgan v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 284 Cal. Rptr. 745, 752 (Ct. App.
1991) ("As to the quasi-legislative acts of administrative agencies, judicial review is limited
to an examination of the proceedings before the officer to determine whether his action
has been arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support." (quoting Pitts v.
Perluss, 377 P.2d 83,88 (Cal. 1962) (internal quotes omitted)).
95. County of Riverside v. City of Murrieta, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 606, 608 (Ct. App. 1998)
("The ultimate determination is whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found for the
respondents [City] based on the whole record." (quoting Kuhn v. Dept. of Gen. Servs., 29
Cal. Rptr. 2d 191,194 (Ct. App. 1994)).
96. Amicus Brief on Behalf of Three California Cities and One Redevelopment
Agency in Support of Defendants and Respondents at 2, Friends of Mammoth v. Town of
Mammoth Lakes, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334 (Ct. App. 2000) (No. C031043).
97. Friends of Mammoth, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350 ("If the word 'substantial' means
anything at all, it clearly implies that such evidence must be of ponderable legal
significance. Obviously, the word cannot be deemed synonymous with 'any' evidence. It
must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; it must actually be 'substantial'
proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case." (quoting Estate of
Teed, 247 P.2d 54,58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952)); Beach-Courchesne v. City of Diamond Bar, 95
Cal. Rptr. 2d 265, 270 (Ct. App. 2000) ("The Supreme Court has cautioned that '[public
agencies and courts both should be chary of the use of the [redevelopment] act unless...
there is a situation where the blight is such that it constitutes a real hindrance to the
development of the city and cannot be eliminated or improved without public assistance."'
(quoting Sweetwater Valley Civic Assn. v. City of Nat'l City, 555 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Cal.
1976)).
98. City of Diamond Bar, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 268.
99. Appellants' Opening Brief at 13 n.13, City of Diamond Bar (No. B130244)
(Council member Werner complained about lack of proper planning when the county
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community, set amidst rolling hills and valleys at the junction of two
major freeways, may appear close to picture-perfect. Only about
20% of the city's land area is nonresidential and much of that is
dedicated to schools and parkland.1°° But the city of Diamond Bar
was a fiscal loser.
Because California cities depend heavily on sales taxes as a
revenue source, Diamond Bar officials weren't pleased to learn from
a 1995 survey of 400 residents that 86% of them "most often purchase
their retail merchandise outside of the City of Diamond Bar."''1 1
From 1991 to 1994, seven of the eight surrounding communities,
many with successful redevelopment programs of their own,
experienced increased taxable retail sales while Diamond Bar's
taxable sales decreased by almost five percent.1°2
Only about 2% of Diamond Bar's land is dedicated to
commercial uses.10 3 Most of Diamond Bar's retail centers were built
in the 1970s and 1980s and had become obsolete by the mid-1990s.1' 4
They generally consisted of strip retail centers and small shopping
centers conspicuously devoid of anchors (big retailers like department
stores, whose presence draws shoppers), short on parking and 24%
vacant.105
Other types of real estate were not faring much better. Office
vacancy rates in Diamond Bar ran from 20 to 40%, and its industrial
controlled land use decisions in the irea but observed that redevelopment was necessary
to "take control over the land use and planning decisions that are helping make this
community as nice as it is.").
100. City of Diamond Bar, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 268.
101. Respondents' Brief at 24, City of Diamond Bar (No. B130244). The city's
consumer survey didn't help as much as the city might have hoped. From appellants'
brief:
The Survey undercuts any possible finding of economic blight in the Project Area
because:
1. Fewer than 1 out of 4 Diamond Bar residents think their retail shopping areas
are 'unattractive'.
2. Only 8% of Diamond Bar residents feel that the appearance or services of the
Diamond Bar retail businesses need improvement.
3. Only 6% of Diamond Bar residents feel any need to improve traffic control.
The court mentions the third of these survey results in footnote 7. City of Diamond Bar,
95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 275 n.7.
102. Appellants' Opening Brief at 37 (citing Administrative Record VII:110:1962).
Appellants pointed out that the city's consultant neglected to include the positive sales tax
data for 1995-96, and that sales taxes had increased 2.65% in 1994. Appellants' Opening
Brief at 37 (citing Administrative Record X:170:2811).
103. City of Diamond Bar, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 268.
104. Id. at 274.
105. Respondents' Brief at 25 (citing Administrative Record VII:110:1965-66).
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vacancy rate stood at 16%.106 Owners of sites in planned industrial
and office subdivisions desperately sought solutions. Southern
California was in the midst of a real estate recession, but values were
receding faster in Diamond Bar's commercial and industrial areas
than elsewhere in Los Angeles county, registering an 11% decrease at
a time when county values were down a comparatively enviable
1.78%.
Diamond Bar officials came to realize that only the most
expensive housing ($500,000 and up) would yield sufficient property
taxes to offset the cost of municipal services and support the quality
of public improvements that affluent residents desired.10 7 Diamond
Bar had to choose between restricting housing development to pricey
gated communities and nurturing better use of the commercial and
industrial land within its turf. It chose the latter.
Seven years after incorporation, the city council commissioned
an initial study to explore the feasibility of redevelopment and
adopted a redevelopment plan in 1997.108 The council placed virtually
all of the city's commercial and industrial land into the
redevelopment project area.10 9 Improving the city's tax base was high
on its redevelopment agenda." 0 Diamond Bar planned to enhance its
tax base by using tax increments to lure new business, subsidize the
rehabilitation of existing ones, improve roads, upgrade schools and
parks, install streetscaping to create a pedestrian-friendly retail
environment, and provide other public amenities.
On behalf of a dozen Diamond Bar residents, one of California's
leading redevelopment attorneys, Murray 0. Kane, and his law
partners successfully intercepted the plan. Though the challengers
lost at trial, they won on appeal when a unanimous three judge
appellate panel overturned the trial court's determination, finding no
substantial evidence of the requisite blight in Diamond Bar."'
106. 1I
107. The Diamond Bar General Plan listed (and rejected) as an option driving home
prices above the $500,000 to increase property taxes sufficient to support city services.
Appellants' Opening Brief at 6-7 (citing Administrative Record XI:196:3058).
108. Respondents' Brief at 9,13 (citing Administrative Record 1:5:173-75).
109. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 8 (citing Administrative Record 1:1:78-89).
110. Appellants' Opening Brief at 6-7 (citing Administrative Record XI:196:3058).
Anticipating that demands for municipal services would outpace municipal revenues, the
city recognized the need to utilize redevelopment in order to upgrade its commercial core.
111. City of Diamond Bar, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 279.
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(2) Framing Diamond Bar as Blight Free
At some point, the appellate court became convinced Diamond
Bar had no blight and had chosen redevelopment as "simply a
vehicle ... to finance community improvements.""n2
For starters, the court emphasized the specific wording of the
1993 statute which required proof of both physical and economic
blight within the project area so serious as to burden the community
as a whole." 3 To demonstrate that the proposed redevelopment area
could have had no such impact, Murray 0. Kane videotaped a 28
minute tour of the designated project area. The appellate court
summarized what it saw on the tape as follows: "This court feels
compelled to comment that it viewed the plaintiffs' videotapes in
their entirety and did not perceive anything remotely resembling
blight. The videotapes depicted modem, well-maintained, retail and
office structures, amidst ample landscaping and open space, in a
partially rustic setting.""14
The court also cited language from Diamond Bar's 1995 General
Plan that signaled the potential establishment of a redevelopment
agency as a vehicle to fund the city's infrastructure budget." 5
Without a word about physical or economic blight to eradicate, the
General Plan acknowledged that the city had a "fairly new
infrastructure system" but needed "to plan now for the anticipated
increase in traffic, the maintenance of existing facilities, to fund new
facilities, and to support future services to enhance the quality of life
in Diamond Bar.""n6
(3) Parsing the Blight Statute
How, then, did Diamond Bar-its consultants, legal advisors, and
a majority of the city council-go wrong? For one thing, they
emphasized different aspects of the blight-defining statutes than did
Murray 0. Kane and the appellate court. Counsel for the city
stressed that the statute required no more of the agency than that it
show the presence of one of four enumerated physical blighting
conditions and one of five enumerated economic blighting factors
which, in combination, demonstrate the need for redevelopment. The
112. Id. The General Plan had described redevelopment as a way "to facilitate the
mitigation of traffic and circulation deficiencies, the financing of public improvements and
other similar tasks." Id. at 269.
113. Id. at271.
114. Id. at 270 n.4.
115. Id. at268.
116. Id. at 278.
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protestors pointed to statutory language specifying that the agency
must prove more than simply a single type of physical and a single
type of economic blight." 7 Blight in the proposed project area must
be so serious as to burden the rest of the community.
118
(4) No Physical Blight in Diamond Bar
Because the appellate court flunked Diamond Bar for not fitting
its project within the statutory conditions defining physical blight, the
court never reached the sub-section of the statute defining economic
blighting conditions.
As mentioned earlier, the first of four physical blighting
conditions concerns unfit buildings. The appellate court concluded
that Diamond Bar had abandoned at trial any effort to prove the
project area contained buildings unsafe or unhealthy for living or
working. Although Diamond Bar's attorneys did not intend this
result,119 they did acknowledge some difficulty satisfying this
condition. Counsel for Diamond Bar believed that they didn't have
to demonstrate the presence of dilapidated buildings because that was
but one of four possible ways to demonstrate physical blight.
The statute's second blighting physical condition mixes physical
components such as inadequate lot size and lack of parking with
economic loss, including loss from difficulties in making economically
viable use of land.120 The court faulted the city for failing to "identify
a single building" as suffering from inadequate vehicular access,
substandard building materials, or inadequate loading areas.121 Even
if it had identified such a building, the city would then have had to
show how these deficiencies "hindered the economically viable use"
of the identified property and how the redevelopment plan would
solve the problem. The redevelopment agency believed it met its
burden when it pointed to parking and loading area deficiencies in
the project area which would be alleviated through the agency's plans
to lure new firms and subsidize upgrades to existing retail facilities. It
117. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33030(b)(2)(A).
118. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33030(b)(1).
119. Counsel for Diamond Bar believed the record supported a claim under this
category, and simply chose to let the record speak for itself at trial as a strategic choice,
not a withdrawal of the claim. Petition for Review for Respondents City of Diamond Bar
and Diamond Bar Redevelopment Agency.
120. R. Bruce Tepper, Establishing Blight in the Plan Adoption Process: Have
California Courts Raised the Bar?, Presentation for California Redevelopment Association
Legal Issue Symposium, Aug. 9-10, 2000, at 6 (on file with author). Much of the statutory
analysis in the text is drawn from this paper.
121. City of Diamond Bar, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 274-75.
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hadn't anticipated having to provide a building-by-building analysis
or having to show how particular physical deficiencies had caused
specific firms to become unprofitable.22
Incompatible land uses are at the core of the third physical
blighting condition. This condition also has both a physical
("adjacent or nearby uses that are incompatible with each other") and
an economic component ("prevent[s] the economic development of
those parcels or other portions of the project area").'2
To make its case on this point, the city cited as evidence of
incompatible uses some industrial areas located near schools. It
mentioned specifically the "potential hazard to children" exacerbated
by the absence of a traffic signal at a busy intersection separating the
school from many industrial uses.124 But this evidence did not help.
Diamond Bar neglected to show any connection between the
redevelopment plan and the alleged incompatibility. Even if the
industrial uses were harmful to the school, the city had no intention of
acquiring and relocating the school or eliminating the industrial
uses.'25 Although respondents' brief alluded to vacancy rates as high
as 50% in some of the industrial and commercial buildings near the
school,126 the city offered no plausible explanation of how proximity
to the school had led to the high industrial vacancy rate or prevented
the economic development of the industrial parcels. 2 7
To meet the fourth physical blight condition concerning
irregularly shaped or useless small lots in multiple ownership, the city
had pointed to 48 parcels, including 10 of the city's 15 retail shopping
centers, held in multiple ownership. In response, the court advanced
this point from Appellants' Brief: "The mere fact of multiple
ownership does not establish blight. Otherwise, a condominium
development by definition would be blighted."'12
The city's consultants contended that its retail areas were too
small and poorly configured to accommodate large scale "power
centers" and "big box" type retailers.129 There were two problems
with the city's embracing its consultant's analysis on this point. First,
the city had banned "big box" retailing through its general plan.
122. Respondents' Petition for Rehearing at 3-6, City of Diamond Bar (No. B130244).
123. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33031(a)(3) (West 1999).
124. Respondents' Brief at 26 (citing Administrative Record VII:110:1965-66).
125. City of Diamond Bar, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 277 n.10.
126. Respondents' Brief at 26 (citing Administrative Record VII:110:1965-66).
127. City of Diamond Bar, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276-77.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 275-76.
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Second, a number of undeveloped parcels existed within the project
area, including parcels of 47, 41, 36, 35, and 24 acres that were large
enough for such retailing.
In sum, the appellate court opinion held out little hope that
Diamond Bar could ever fashion a lawful redevelopment project
along the lines of the proposal it had been advancing.
B. The Mammoth Lakes Case
(1) The Setting
Mammoth Lakes is a small community of approximately 24
square miles, on the eastern side of the Sierra Nevada Mountain
range. It is surrounded by national forest land and includes the
Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, one of the largest in the United
States. Founded on ski-based tourism, the town grew rapidly in the
1960s and '70s and incorporated in 1984. Half of Mono County's
10,900 residents live in the town. The California real estate recession
of the 1990's hit the area hard as evidenced by a stark 50% decline in
ski ticket sales, which fell precipitously from 1.4 million per year in
the mid-1980s to about 730,000 in 1997.130
According to its 1992 general plan, the Town of Mammoth Lakes
aspired to become a "unique, high-quality destination resort
community with year-round recreational opportunities.' 131 But its
modest airport lacked a jet runway, and the town had no luxury
resorts or upscale retail. Although the town had granted land use
approvals to several promising mixed use projects, all of these
projects were stalled in the recession. 32 In 1996 the town council
instructed its redevelopment staff to begin the studies necessary to
form a project area. To fulfill its mission, the staff worked with a
private developer, Infrawest, which had acquired the approved but as
yet unbuilt sites. Together they developed a plan to use TIF as a
means of subsidizing new tourist facilities and funding the requisite
public infrastructure, from parking and snow storage areas to the
creation of a viable downtown village center.
33
130. Mr. Gregory, CEO, Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, at the June 4, 1997 meeting of
the Redevelopment Agency Board of Directors Special Meeting. Respondents' Brief at
61, Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334 (Ct. App.
2000) (No. C031043).
131. Opening Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants at 1, Friends of Mammoth (citing
Administrative Record 13:1938).
132 Id at 5.
133.
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(2) The Bases for Legal Challenge
As in Diamond Bar, Murray 0. Kane and his law partners
represented the challengers. Here, again, they lost at trial and
prevailed on appeal. They succeeded in persuading the appellate
court that the redevelopment project area failed to qualify as
predominantly urbanized, nor was it physically blighted.
(3) Absence of Physical Blight
The discussion of physical blight in the Mammoth Lakes
appellate opinion paralleled the discussion in the Diamond Bar case.
Where the statute had called for evidence of buildings "unsafe or
unhealthy for persons to live or work in," the city council had relied
on a consultant's building conditions survey that had failed to identify
even one building meeting that criteria. The survey had characterized
some buildings as dilapidated or deteriorated but had neglected to
distinguish between trivial and serious defects. From the survey it
wasn't possible to tell whether a building had been regarded as
dilapidated because of a collapsing foundation or peeling paint, a
perilously sagging roof or sloppy maintenance.134
The statute described as physically blighted a building or lot that
was not economically viable due to substandard design, lack of
parking, or other similar conditions.135  To qualify under this
standard, the town had identified many properties short of parking
and snow storage areas. But it could not prove definitively that any
of them were unprofitable specifically due to these inadequacies. 136
Likewise, in treating incompatible uses, the town failed to cite even a
single instance of total prevention of economic development due to
The purposes of the Redevelopment Plan were to spur economic growth while
providing more affordable housing, thereby improving employment
opportunities and increasing tax revenues to fund infrastructure improvements,
provide financial assistance for development of new tourism facilities, remove
hazardous wastes and blighted structures and sites, provide public parking and
snow storage areas, facade improvements in commercial areas, and better land
utilization and land use planning. Principal projects were to include affordable
housing programs; revitalizing Main Street and Old Mammoth Road commercial
properties; creating a downtown village center; adding parking, sidewalks,
shopping, and lodging facilities; various improved community and tourist service
facilities; and improving many aesthetic aspects of the Project Area.
Petition for Review, Attorneys for Town of Mammoth Lakes and Mammoth Lakes
Redevelopment Agency at 5-6, Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 334,360 (Ct. App. 2000) (No. C031043).
134. Friends of Mammoth, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360.
135. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33031(a)(2).
136. Friends of Mammoth, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 362.
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the alleged incompatibilities. The town's attorneys could find nothing
in the statute requiring a "quantification of the impact on economic
viability," "much less on an individual parcel basis,"'1 37 but this is
precisely what the appellate court was looking for.
(4) Redevelopment Reserved for Areas Predominantly Urbanized
By statute, redevelopment is deemed appropriate only for
"predominantly urbanized" areas. 138  The statute defines a
predominantly urbanized area as one where not less than 80% of the
land is developed for urban uses or is an integral part of a developed
urban area, itself surrounded by other developed urban uses.139 To
comply with this requirement, redevelopment agencies need a survey
to determine which developed sites qualify as urban. The survey
must classify each vacant site as either an integral part of the urban
fabric or as non-urban. No vacant site can be called urban unless it is
surrounded by urban development. 4°
The appellate court concluded that the Town of Mammoth
Lakes erred in tallying the urban portions of its project area. Under
the court's recalculations, the town' 41 had a project less than 80%
urbanized. The town had counted as urban several sites that were
partly built and developed consistent with zoning but largely vacant.
Of these sites, the largest were being used for the airport, a college,
and a golf course. The 84-acre golf course site had been included as
part of an approved master plan for a 222-acre mixed use, destination
resort project. Because only a club house and parking lot had been
built thus far, the appellate court classified all the greens as non-
urban, explaining:
The mere fact that land is developed as a golf course does not
conclusively render the use an urban use for purposes of
redevelopment. Here, this golf course is designed as a "mountain
137. Brief for Appellants at 27, Friends of Mammoth.
138. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33030(b)(1) (West 1999).
139. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33320.1 (West 1999).
140. R. Bruce Tepper, Presentation for California Redevelopment Association Legal
Issue Symposium, Establishing Blight in the Plan Adoption Process: Have California
Courts Raised the Bar?, Aug. 9-10, 2000, at 10 (on file with author).
141. Although the text treats the town as synonymous with the redevelopment agency,
California cities and their redevelopment agencies are legally autonomous. California
cities and counties have the option under state law of designating themselves to be the
redevelopment agency board. But even when they do, under California law the
redevelopment agency and the community are regarded as distinct entities. One
consequence is that cities are not responsible for the debts of their redevelopment
agencies and vice versa. See generally Pac. States Enters. v. City of Coachella, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 68 (Ct. App. 1993).
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course" with significant amounts of natural and preserved forest
lands and water features interspersed throughout the course.
Further, the course was developed on what was otherwise
undeveloped forest land, and continues to be surrounded by
undeveloped forest land. The characteristics of this golf course can
hardly be related to or characteristic of a city or a densely
populated area. We conclude there is no substantial evidence on
which the Town Council could determine the Lodestar golf course
was an urban use.
142
Similarly, the court found no evidence to justify the inclusion of
the vacant portions of the airport as urban. 43 This struck the
Mammoth redevelopment agency's attorneys as evidence the court
was discriminating against small town redevelopment because the
court would never have claimed that any portions of LAX were non-
urban.144 Also classified as non-urban were 74 of the 76 acres
reserved for expansion of a community college. Eventually, the
college planned to build out most of its property. But because the
only college building presently in place occupied a two-acre parcel,
just those two acres could qualify as urban, according to the appellate
court.145
Understandably, the Town had included all these sites within its
redevelopment project boundaries hoping to offer Infrawest
incentives to develop its properties in ways that would most benefit
the entire town. Mammoth officials were particularly eager to induce
Infrawest to locate and design its commercial hub to complement
instead of obliterate the already fragile town center. The rejuvenated
airport offered an especially promising source of local tax revenue.
142. Friends of Mammoth, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335.
143. Id at 356-57.
144.
It is clear just from the maps that almost all of the land in these two parcels is
already occupied by runways, buildings, and other development. From the table
and the maps, the Town calculates that the land occupied by the facilities alone
totals at least 130 acres, excluding setbacks, safety zones, and the areas between
buildings. It is obvious that the Airport is fully urbanized. The Court of Appeal,
however, refused to consider as urbanized any part of the airport not reduced to
a measurement, stating "the Town's calculations admit all 202 acres of the airport
land are not developed for urban uses." An airport in a Los Angeles
redevelopment project would never be subject to this level of scrutiny. The
Court of Appeal went out of its way to ignore the inferences logically and
reasonably drawn from the evidence before the Town Council and instead
adopted an interpretation of Section 33320.1 that is hostile to small communities.
Brief for Appellants at 24, Friends of Mammoth. But, then, LAX isn't surrounded by
national forests.
145. Friends of Mammoth, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 356.
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Now the Town is left with the unhappy choice of revising its plan to
encompass a much reduced project area or abandoning its
redevelopment program entirely.
C. Did Diamond Bar and Mammoth Lakes Make New Law?
In one respect, these two cases have made new law by requiring
an exacting level of documentation for redevelopment agencies to
surmount the "physical blight" and "predominantly urbanized" bars
the 1993 legislation set in place. But the California Supreme Court
with its 1976 opinion in Sweetwater Valley Civic Association v. City of
National City'46 had already set a high standard.
In Sweetwater, the California Supreme Court reversed both a
trial and an appellate court 47 in ruling against a redevelopment
project designed to facilitate the conversion of a marginal golf course
into a regional shopping mall. For 18 years, the Bonita Golf Course
had been operated in an area subject to periodic flooding. Then, a
freeway extension opened the possibility of putting the site to the
intense commercial use for which it had been re-zoned four years
earlier. Eager to sell the site to the city or a shopping center
developer, the owner sought city funding of the public infrastructure
necessary to make the site fully developable.148
The redevelopment agency's prospects for clearing the blight
standard of the day were promising. At the time, blight could be
found in "an economic dislocation... resulting from faulty
planning."' 49  The Bonita site was only 57% as valuable as
comparable sites in town, and its relatively low property value could
be seen as having resulted from faulty planning because water run-off
inundated the site with mud and debris for periods of up to two weeks
at a time.
To the California Supreme Court, the statutory reference to
economic dislocation did not justify the city trying to increase its tax
yield by replacing the golf course with a shopping mall. Rather, the
court believed that a finding of economic dislocation could only be
supported by proof that the site had no economically viable use. That
simply wasn't true as the record showed "the golf course is at least
146. 555 P.2d 1099 (Cal. 1976).
147. Sweetwater Valley Civic Ass'n v. City of Nat'l City, 126 Cal. Rptr. 591, 595 (Ct.
App. 1976) [hereinafter Sweetwater].
148. Id. at 594.
149. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33031(a) (amended 1993) (quoted in
Sweetwater, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 595).
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marginally profitable." 150  The Court also noted that "the
maintenance of open space land for recreational purposes is in the
public interest," citing the Open-Space Lands Act, which discouraged
premature conversion of open space lands to urban uses.151 As the
California Supreme Court explained, the city had come to view the
site as a liability not because of how it was being used but because of
its unrealized potential.
52
Following the lead of the California Supreme Court, appellate
courts have rejected both redevelopment plans designed to facilitate
the conversion of vacant lands into urban uses153 and project areas
which have counted low density development as urban.
5 4
VI.The Limited Utility of Looking to Courts to Police the
Blight Statute
Despite Sweetwater, Diamond Bar, and the 1993 statutory
revisions, some cities continue to deploy redevelopment solely for the
tax dollars it can bring.
Consider Maywood, a town about 10 miles southeast of
downtown Los Angeles and California's most densely populated city,
with 40,000 residents crowding 1.14 square miles. 55  This small,
working-class, immigrant-friendly town suffers terribly from outdated
infrastructure including overburdened sewers, a water system run by
three struggling ratepayer-owned companies with water pressure so
150. Sweetwater Valley Civic Ass'n, 555 P.2d at 1104.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1103-04. Eventually, a regional mall, the Bonita Plaza, was constructed on
the site, to which the city contributed a multi-level parking structure.
153. Emmington v. Solano County Redevelopment Agency, 237 Cal. Rptr. 636,642 (Ct.
App. 1987) (County's redevelopment plan rejected for conversion of 10,350 acres, mostly
agricultural, into water-dependent industrial uses. Project contemplated possible
construction of an industrial road, a rail line, shipping berths and water-oriented
commercial recreation facilities. County failed to prove blight. Occasional flooding and
lack of infrastructure did not hinder productive use of land for agriculture. Nor was there
any evidence that agricultural uses burdened the community or region. "Instead,
respondents have admitted forthrightly that the redevelopment plan was devised and
adopted as a funding mechanism to 'implement' the area plan after anticipated industrial
developed failed to occur.").
154. County of Riverside v. City of Murietta, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 606 (Ct. App. 1998)
(Redevelopment plan for over 3,500 acres rejected for including rural-residential and
equestrian-residential properties with minimum lot sizes of 2.5 and .5 acres respectively,
and minimal "true" blight, best evidenced by slum conditions-decrepit housing, high
crime rates, and cost of municipal services far exceeding revenue generated from project
area. The City of Murietta cited no such conditions.).
155. James Ricci, Metropolis: Snapshots From the Center of the Universe, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2001 (Magazine), at 5.
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low the county Fire Department won't approve high-rise housing, and
twenty-eight miles of roadway the mayor describes as being "more
potholes than original paving material".
In its preliminary redevelopment plan, Maywood's
redevelopment agency explains that the town's average household
size of 4.565 persons per household, among the highest in the county,
"has undoubtedly contributed to the accelerated deterioration of
much of the city's housing stock and local infrastructure systems
through over-use."' 56 "It's just a never-ending battle going after the
converted garages, the inhabited laundry rooms, the single-family
dwellings that have been divided two and three times," says David
Mango, the city's building and planning director. 57 Nearly half of
Maywood's apartments are overcrowded.158 With the town and its
environs fully built-out, there are few opportunities for new
construction.
With the high level of "sales tax leakage" to surrounding
communities a by-product of Maywood's limited and declining
commercial and industrial area and only modest residential uses to
tax, the town has lately turned to redevelopment to finance sewer,
drainage, water, park, and road improvements. 59 By placing the
entire community within a redevelopment project area, the town
anticipates receiving any future increases in property tax revenue.
Under Proposition 13, this channeling of tax increment will occur
independent of any redevelopment effort as properties are assessed at
market value upon sale and as assessments are increased to reflect the
value added by new construction.160 In addition, Los Angeles County
will be obliged to pass forward to the city redevelopment agency the
property tax proceeds from Proposition 13's allowable annual
inflation factor of 2%.
An examination of Maywood's redevelopment plan reveals no
specific projects to alleviate blight despite the statutory requirement
to describe both the specific projects proposed and how those projects
"will improve or alleviate" the physical and economic blighting
156. MAYWOOD REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY, PRELIMINARY PLAN, CITY-WIDE
REDEVELOPMENT PROJECr, May 2,2000, at 1.
157. Id-
158. As defined by Maywood, an overcrowded unit is one occupied by more than 1.5
persons per room.
159. MAYWOOD REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY, REDEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR THE CITY-
WIDE REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT, Nov. 29, 2000, at 18-19.
160. CAL. CONsT. art XIII.
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conditions cited in the preliminary report.161 Nothing in Maywood's
redevelopment documentation even approximates the level of detail
found in the plans of Diamond Bar or Town of Mammoth Lakes.
Apparently, Maywood could afford only the "boiler-plate"
redevelopment plans that Maywood's redevelopment consultants
provided. Challengers could have proved this was just the sort of
naked grab for tax increment revenue to fund infrastructure
improvements that state law clearly prohibited. 62 But the Maywood
redevelopment proceeded unchallenged. 63
Courts are not a reliable source for ensuring compliance with
statutory blight standards because many of the nonconforming
redevelopment plans, like Maywood's, will never be challenged in
court. For one thing, these lawsuits are quite expensive. Although
judicial review is based on the administrative record, rather than a
new trial on the facts,164 that record can often be extensive. In
Diamond Bar the record consisted of 11 volumes, 3000 pages; in
Mammoth Lakes, 65 volumes, 10,000 pages. A redevelopment
challenger would want to shape the record by participating directly in
the lengthy administrative process, possibly by paying for the
testimony of its own experts before the redevelopment board and city
161. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33344.5 (e)-(f) (West 1999).
162. The statutory concept is that the redevelopment project is needed to eliminate
blight, not that the redevelopment project area occasions a tax increment windfall usable
to upgrade infrastructure. "A blighted area also may be one that contains the conditions
described in subdivision (b) [defining blight] and is, in addition, characterized by the
existence of inadequate public improvements, parking facilities, or utilities." CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 33030 (West 1999) (emphasis added).
Further, a literal reading suggests that the state redevelopment law prohibits the
placement of an entire community within redevelopment project boundaries. Blight must
be found to be "so prevalent and so substantial that it causes a reduction of, or lack of,
proper utilization of the area to such an extent that it constitutes a serious physical and
economic burden on the community...." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33030.
Hence, the blighted area must be impacting parts of town that are not blighted. Under
this reading, redevelopment is barred if there are no good parts of town susceptible of
being harmed from adjoining blighted areas.
163. Maywood is not the only city flaunting state redevelopment law unchallenged by
placing itself entirely within a redevelopment project area solely to rake in tax increment
funds to supplement the city's infrastructure budget. See WESTMINSTER
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY, REDEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR THE WESTMINSTER
INFRASTRUCTURE REVITALIZATION PROJECT, July 12, 2000. The same consultants
prepared both the Maywood and Westminster plans.
164. A modest exception: challengers could introduce at trial evidence of fraud, bad
faith, or abuse of discretion in the way the administrative record had been put together.
In re Redevelopment Plan for Bunker Hill, 389 P.2d 538, 551-52 (Cal. 1964) (as
interpreted by Fosselman's, Inc. v. City of Alhambra, 224 Cal. Rptr. 361, 363 (Ct. App.
1986)).
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council. No redevelopment opponent can safely enjoy the option of
waiting until the city council has voted to approve the project before
deciding whether to take the city to court. To be considered in court,
evidence that the project area is not blighted must have been part of
the administrative record establishing the redevelopment plan.
165
What's more, the California legislature has set a short time limit
for bringing suits challenging the validity of agency action: sixty days
after adoption of the redevelopment project boundary. 66 A
challenger would need to master the voluminous administrative
record within two months to meet the deadline. Besides, challengers
need to be prepared to fund appeals. Trial courts, as in Diamond Bar
and Mammoth Lakes, have tended to side with local governments.
Victories upholding the statutory blight requirement are often
achieved only at the appellate level.
The attorneys and consultants in the best position to bring
challenges within the sixty-day window are those who specialize in
redevelopment law. But they normally earn their livelihoods working
for redevelopment agencies, not against them. Still, there are
principled "insider" challengers. Murray 0. Kane explained why he
took on the Diamond Bar case:
If Diamond Bar gets away with it, then California's reform
legislation is greatly weakened, and a legislative backlash could go
beyond stopping redevelopment abuse, and will also hurt
redevelopment in truly blighted areas where redevelopment is
really needed. 67
However, the public-spirited inclination of firms specializing in
redevelopment to undertake these cases will often be overcome by
their need to appease other redevelopment agency clients not thrilled
to see their attorneys embroiled in suits against sister agencies.
To be sure, there are "outside" challengers-counties, school
districts, and principled or ideologically motivated "public interest"
advocates. There may also be aggrieved property owners within
proposed project boundaries. Some may want more money for their
land than the agency wishes to pay. Other owners may seek just to
stay put, and possibly benefit from the renewal uplift. Finally, there
165. Fosselman's, Inc., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64 (Court declined protestor's invitation to
tour the project area so as to "take judicial notice that the area... is not a blighted area."
Challengers are admonished to include all evidence in the administrative proceedings
leading to enactment of the redevelopment plan.).
166. CAL. CIV. PROC. §§ 860 et seq. (West 2000).
167. Did Diamond Bar Conduct a $450 Million Raid on School Funds?, DIAMOND
BARIWALNUT NEWS GAZEtTE, May 1,1999.
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are property owners such as retailers and movie theater owners
outside the redevelopment plan boundaries trying to block what they
regard as unfair competition.
None of these present the reliable and consistent challenges
necessary to police the blight requirement. Not long after the
enactment of the 1993 legislation, the Legislative Analyst's Office
examined redevelopment activity from January 1993 to August 1994,
and found "no evidence that redevelopment project areas established
in 1994 are smaller in size or more focused on eliminating urban
blight than project areas adopted in earlier years," "contrary to
predictions by redevelopment officials. ' 168 The three large projects
the Legislative Analyst's Office questioned consisted of 3500, 2207,
and 925 acres, and were located within the cities of Murrieta and
Perris and the City and County of Sacramento, respectively. A court
order halted the first,169 and the other two were modified to conform
to the statute, according to the California Redevelopment
Association, a voluntary trade group which counts 300 redevelopment
agencies as members.70 Nonetheless, the Legislative Analyst's Office
remains skeptical that anyone will consistently enforce local agency
compliance with redevelopment law.
As the Legislative Analyst's Office noted:
[Flew residents or businesses pursued their redevelopment
challenge in court or through the reference process. For example,
despite considerable local opposition to the redevelopment project
area near San Diego State University, local residents and business
officials did not commence a lawsuit or referendum challenging the
plan adoption, citing the high cost of such actions.171
Further, some aggrieved property owners may decide their long-term
interests are best served by not suing an agency in a city from which
they could someday be seeking zone changes, subdivision approvals,
or conditional use or building permits.
The Legislative Analyst's Office explained why other taxing
entities were not reliable redevelopment project challengers:
School funding is essentially guaranteed by state school financing
formulas-and special district property tax revenues are not
significantly affected by the creation of redevelopment projects due
to their low overall share of the property tax base. Thus, in many
168. PRELIMINARY LOOK, supra note 41, at 1.
169. County of Riverside v. City of Murietta, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 606, 614 (Ct. App. 1998).
170. COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, UPDATE ON THE IMPACT OF AB
1290 (unpublished, undated manuscript on file with author).
171. PRELIMINARY LOOK, supra note 41, at 12-13.
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cases, the only entity which will perceive a fiscal incentive to
expand their CRL [Community Redevelopment Law] oversight
efforts will be the county, because its share of the local property tax
is generally a significant portion of their revenue base.
The 1993 legislation may have compromised the role of counties as
challengers of city redevelopment proposals by entitling them
automatically to a share of the increment and prohibiting pass-
through settlements.172 County supervisors need to calculate whether
the chance of persuading the courts to invalidate the project justifies
the costs and political risks of a legal challenge.
Many counties now have active redevelopment authorities.
173
Because county projects don't divert tax revenues from cities, just
from school and special districts, cities aren't likely to challenge
county projects in the way counties sometimes protest city ones. To
stop counties from violating the blight statute, this leaves only special
districts, angry residents, and individuals fronting for businesses
trying to head off competition from redevelopment projects.
Concluding that some illegal projects would almost certainly go
unchallenged, the Legislative Analyst's Office recommended
establishing a state redevelopment review authority within the office
of the state Attorney General and funded by fees charged to local
redevelopment agencies.174  Under this proposal, all new
redevelopment projects would have been subject to the costs and
delays of state-level administrative review by the Attorney General,
who would also have had legal standing to challenge any
redevelopment activities that were contrary to state law. The
proposal was never enacted. 175
VII. The Case for a Planning-Inspired Relaxation of the
Definition of Blight
Cities and counties cannot attain a full array of land use planning
goals by utilizing only their traditional land use powers. Once a site
or an area is fully developed, the owners' rights "vest" against
changed land use controls except for a narrow range of regulations
172. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33607.5.
173. Eighteen counties have active agencies currently working on 55 projects. ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 25, fig. 20 at xx.
174. PRELIMINARY LOOK, supra note 41, at 13.
175. However, the Department of Finance was specifically designated as an interested
party in any action brought regarding the validity of an ordinance adopting a
redevelopment plan. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33501(b).
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enacted for health or safety reasons.176 Local governments have
limited tools for modifying areas that are already developed unless
property owners seek to redevelop on their own. Although cities can
be quite inventive in wielding their land use powers to secure a range
of public benefits when developers seek permits, in the end, land use
controls amount to nothing more than the right of a city council to
"just say no" to development proposals.
Redevelopment, as Charles Abrams observed over three decades
ago, "supplies a multipurpose opportunity in place of the piecemeal
efforts to correct traffic problems, provide playgrounds and open
spaces, provide neighborhood amenities, and new housing, public and
private."' 77 Without such pro-active powers, cities and counties must
remain largely passive players in shaping the use of land within their
boundaries, even when the private sector isn't fulfilling community
planning aspirations. Why shouldn't redevelopment agencies be
empowered to re-plan developed urban areas so as to improve traffic
flow, the mix of land uses, or the quality of open space? 178 A recent
national survey of blight laws demonstrated that no jurisdiction has
ever attempted to enforce a blight test as stringent as California's. 179
Perhaps we should consider relaxing the definition of blight to
legitimize a broader use of redevelopment as means of affirmative
planning.
A. The Olivette Town Center Example
Consider this example from the town of Olivette, population
7438, one of the 90 cities within metropolitan St. Louis.180 After two
years of negotiation, the city reached a deal with a mid-Western
shopping center developer. The developer would acquire all of the
176. Sunset Amusement Co. v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 496 P.2d 840 (1972); City of
Dublin v. Finkes, 615 N.E.2d 690 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Rhod-A-Zalea & 35th, Inc. v.
County of San Diego, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 617 (Ct. App. 1996).
177. Charles Abrams, Some Blessing of Urban Renewal, in FEDERAL URBAN
RENEWAL LEGISLATION, URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY
560 (James Q. Wilson. ed., 1966).
178. Janice C. Griffith, The Preservation of Community Green Space: Is Georgia Ready
to Combat Sprawl with Smart Growth?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 563, 592-94, 569-70
(2000) (recommending use of tax increment financing for green space, bicycle paths,
pedestrian walks or greenways, and lauding the Atlantic Steel redevelopment project,
which calls for the renovation of a 136-acre soil-contaminated site into a mixed use
community with a bridge over an interstate highway and a walkway to a subway station).
179. Hudson Hayes Luce, The Meaning of Blight: A Survey of Statutory and Case Law,
35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 389, 477 (2000).
180. Information about the Olivette Town Center comes from an interview with
Timothy G. Pickering, Olivette City Manager (Apr. 2,2001).
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homes in an older neighborhood of modest homes called Hilltop and
replace them with a regional mall at the intersection of Interstate 170
and Olive Boulevard, to be called the Olivette Town Center. That
project would be anchored by a Wal-Mart, a Home Depot, and other
"big box" retailers. Estimated project costs exceeded $110,000,000.
To cover part of the site acquisition cost, the town agreed to
rebate the developer nearly $40 million in tax increment to offset the
developer's cost of acquiring the 150 homes in Hilltop without resort
to eminent domain by offering homeowners 2 to 2.5 times market
value. Owners of $70,000 homes could anticipate offers of $150,000
and up. The city council concluded the area was blighted although
none of the homes had been condemned or even cited for health code
violations.
As in California, Missouri remits a portion of the state sales tax
to the "point of origin" city.' 81 The proposed eighty-acre "big box"
shopping mall would produce far greater property, sales, and utility
tax revenue and demand far less in the way of public services than the
homes it would replace. 82 Of particular relevance to Olivette's fiscal
future, Olivette residents would no longer have to spend their sales
tax dollars at a year-old competing development, anchored by a
Target, located in another city two miles away.
To some this project looked like a naked grab for tax revenues-
increased property and sales taxes, 183 accompanied by a bold move by
Olivette to rid itself of some of its less affluent residents. Hilltop
residents' incomes were below the town median. Correctly observing
that Hilltop contained the only affordable homes in town, critics
could plausibly predict that displaced homeowners would be forced to
move out of Olivette even with their generous sale price premiums.
City officials saw the project as advancing important planning
goals while securing Olivette's fiscal future. The low values of the
homes to be taken were attributable in large measure to their being
wedged in an area between the 1-170 freeway and an industrial park,
a location less well suited to housing than to retail development.
Significantly, the town had bargained for more than the typical "big
box" retail center. The developer had agreed to design the mall
181. See Missouri Dept. of Revenue, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for 1998,
68-70, available at http://www.dor.state.mo.us.
182. Wal-Mart was promised fifty percent of the city's share of sales and utility tax
revenue from the project. Irvin J. Zeid, Editorial, Olivette Development Should Go
Fonvard, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Aug. 23,1999, at D16.
183. See, e.g., Julie A. Goshorn, In a TIF: Why Missouri Needs Tax Increment
Financing Reform, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 919 (1999).
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entrance as a distinctive, inviting gateway to the town itself, promised
as tenants a supermarket and other services not presently available in
Olivette, and offered major road improvements including a bridge
and ramp connection to an adjoining freeway.l84
In the end, the project was defeated but not by Missouri's
redevelopment law. That law has an expansive definition of blight,
and Missouri courts apply a redevelopment-friendly standard of
judicial review.185
Although the city council and Hilltop residents overwhelmingly
favored the project, it was narrowly defeated in a referendum the city
council reluctantly called mainly to appease vociferous project
opponents.186  The opposition came mostly from homeowners
residing south of the proposed project area who feared increased
traffic, the "low-end" image, and the undesirable outsiders that
Olivette would attract with discount retailing.187 These residents
disbelieved city traffic studies indicating that only four percent of the
mall's visitors would traverse the main southerly route, a barely
noticeable increase on a road designed to accommodate traffic flows
six times greater than that.
Just as Olivette officials could cite planning goals to support their
in-fated Town Center project, so could officials in Diamond Bar and
the Town of Mammoth Lakes. They could explain that they were
trying both to make their communities more attractive for business
and to work their way out of a deep real estate recession that had
diminished local tax revenues. Diamond Bar also hoped to spark a
retail resurgence. Mammoth Lakes was eager to revive a declining
tourist trade. These communities actively sought to achieve the
stated goals of California planning law: to meet local infrastructure
184. Interview with Timothy G. Pickering, Olivette City Manager (Apr. 2,2001).
185. Tierney v. Planned Indus. Expansion Auth., 742 S.W.2d 146, 151 (Mo. 1987) (en
bane) ("The concept of urban redevelopment has gone far beyond 'slum clearance,' and
the concept of economic under utilization is a valid one."). Missouri courts have adopted
the permissive "fraud, collusion, bad faith" standard. W. Scott McBride, The Use of
Eminent Domain Under Missouri's Urban Redevelopment Corporations Law, 37 WASH.
U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 169, 176-77 (1990).
186. Let the People Decide: Tax-increment Financing, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July
26, 1999, at D16 (beginning with "Here's a radical idea: Give people a voice in deciding
whether their tax dollars should be spent to subsidize private developments that will have
an irrevocable impact on the character of their communities").
187. Sasha Mastroianni, Olivette Residents Protest Plan to Finance Wal-Mart, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, July 19, 1999, at Local 1.
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needs, 188 conserve open space,189 facilitate economic development, 90
and enhance affordable housing opportunities.' 91
The policy question for California redevelopment law is not
whether these proposals make sense in planning terms. That is an
issue for local governments to decide within the boundaries set by
state planning guidelines. State officials need to ask whether the use
of tax increment financing should hinge on whether these project
areas are blighted as state law presently defines blight. While the
notion of local governments taking a pro-active stance to shape
development has its proponents and critics, it is hard to imagine
either camp accepting a stringent definition of blight as an
appropriate way to resolve their differing views.
B. Suggested Limits to the Expanded Blight Definition
Through its 1993 changes, the legislature attempted to put an end
to the use of redevelopment solely as a means of funding public
infrastructure. As the Legislative Analyst's Office explained:
Most cities and counties finance this infrastructure through a
combination of local general revenues; Mello-Roos and
transportation special tax funds; benefit assessments; developer
fees and exactions; and state and federal loans, grants and
subventions. While each of these financing sources has limitations,
the Legislature has never intended for redevelopment to be used to
provide basic municipal infrastructure. Rather, the Legislature has
consistently indicated its intent that communities limit the use of
redevelopment to the correction of extraordinary conditions of
urban decay.192
188. California Government Code section 65302 mandates certain elements to be
included in each local government general plan, including circulation, land use, housing
and conservation elements.
189. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65563, 65564 (authorizing local governments to establish
open space goals and action to realize those goals).
190. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65030.1 (declaring that decisions regarding growth, most of
them made at the local level, should be guided by an effective planning process
undertaken within the framework of statewide goals and policies directed to "land use,
population growth and distribution, development, open space, resource preservation and
utilization, air and water quality, and other related physical, social and economic
development factors").
191. Local governments are required to adopt general plans, and thereafter to approve
no zoning ordinance or subdivision map inconsistent with the plan. Certain plan elements
are required (e.g., transportation, housing). General plans must "make adequate
provision for the housing needs of all economic segments of the community" while
conserving and preserving as much open space as possible. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 65860(a) etseq.
192. PRELIMINARY LOOK, supra note 41, at 10.
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Also objectionable is the use of redevelopment to bulldoze
perfectly good land uses to make way for others just because they
promise bigger tax yields.193 California law attempts to curb such
moves by prohibiting redevelopment agencies from collecting sales
taxes directly, although the host city still pockets the local
government share of the increased sales taxes. 9 4 Previously, some
agencies had enticed major sales tax producers such as auto malls and
big box retailers by agreeing to refund a portion of the sales tax
collected from them. This practice led state legislators to conclude
that some redevelopment agencies were more dedicated to snaring
increased sales tax revenues than eliminating blight. 195 To stop them,
the state now bars redevelopment agencies from placing certain types
of sales tax-generating businesses on vacant sites that had never
before been put to urban uses.196
C. The Bottom Line
Communities should be encouraged to redevelop underutilized
urban land through a definition of blight specially crafted to their
needs, as the legislature has employed in accommodating
redevelopment projects involving the re-use of closed military bases' 97
193. Courts differ when it comes to sanctioning redevelopment undertaken in large
measure to increase the local tax base. Compare City of Minneapolis v. Wurtele, 291
N.W.2d 386, 390 (Minn. 1980) (upholding acquisition of property within a designated
development district because area, admittedly not blighted, was currently "stagnant and
unproductive", "not contributing to the tax base to their full potential" and "existing
buildings and facilities were obsolete"), with In re Opinion of the Justices, 783, 126 N.E.2d
795, 803 (Mass. 1955) (in an advisory opinion on legislation authorizing condemnation of
nonblighted property for redevelopment, court opined that acquisition to improve tax
structure of city is a "kind of indirect public benefit.., never been deemed to render a
project one for a public purpose").
194. BEATrY, supra note 38, at 198-99.
195. Dan Walters, Cities Playing a Blight Game, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 7, 2000,
reprinted in CAL-TAX DIGEST Oct. 2000, at 2; Commentary, Pacheco Bill Would Resurrect
Land Grabs, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr. 5,2001.
196. BEATTY, supra note 38, at 199-200. Auto dealerships were barred from previously
undeveloped sites "because there was rarely a connection between the project and the
elimination of blight." Development for sales tax-generating uses was also banned on
parcels of five acres or larger not previously developed for urban uses, unless the principal
permitted use was office, hotel, manufacturing, or industrial. Again, "assistance was being
given to large volume retailers on large parcels of vacant land, and the connection
between these projects and the elimination of blight was difficult to determine." Id.
197. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33492 et seq. The legislation establishes a
special set of blight conditions-merging, consolidating, and enlarging the pre-existing
list-from which two or more must be selected. However, the plan must cap the amount
of tax increments an agency is authorized to receive. Also, the agency must make
specified payments to school and community college districts after receipt of $100,000 in
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or rebuilding in the wake of disasters.198 The statutory definition of
blight should be re-formulated to promote infill-the intensive re-use
of developed urban parcels. Then, instead of having to shoehorn
planning-motivated redevelopment into the narrow last of the present
blight definition, communities would have a choice. While it isn't
clear that Diamond Bar or Mammoth Lakes could qualify even under
such a re-definition of blight, at least they should be given the chance.
Even if they could not qualify, other communities might, which would
advance the goals of California land use planning laws.
To soften the impacts on other taxing entities, consider the
possibility of allocating to them a larger percentage of the tax
increment than physically blighted redevelopment projects are made
to pay, or reinstating the prerogative of affected taxing entities to
negotiate larger sums from redevelopment agencies. Of course, the
precise language of the redevelopment law means little to cities
prepared to flout it, as some are doing. But cities trying to comply
should not be summarily barred from redeveloping infill sites because
they cannot find the physically blighting conditions state law
presently requires.
tax increments, so that by the fifteenth year after the agency has received this amount,
each district will receive annually 100% of its share. Alternately, the agency may enter
pass-through agreements with any affected taxing entity, including school districts. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33492.9,33492.15
198. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 34000 et seq. Following a major disaster no
blight findings are required for a redevelopment plan adopted within six months and
completed within 24, provided that all tax increments are used only to repair or replace
improvements within the project area that were damaged or destroyed by the disaster.
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APPENDIX
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33030 (1997):
(a) It is found and declared that there exist in many communities
blighted areas which constitute physical and economic liabilities,
requiring redevelopment in the interest of the health, safety, and
general welfare of the people of these communities and of the state.
(b) A blighted area is one that contains both of the following:
(1) An area that is predominantly urbanized... and is an area in
which the combination of conditions set forth in Section 33031 is so
prevalent and so substantial that it causes a reduction of, or lack of,
proper utilization of the area to such an extent that it constitutes a
serious physical and economic burden on the community which
cannot reasonably be expected to be reversed or alleviated by
private enterprise or governmental action or both, without
redevelopment.
(2) An area that is characterized by either of the following:
(A) One or more conditions set forth in any paragraph of
subdivision (a)... and one or more conditions set forth in any
paragraph of subdivision (b)....
(B) The condition described in paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) ....
(C) A blighted area also may be one that contains the conditions
described in subdivision (b) and is, in addition, characterized by the
existence of inadequate public improvements, parking facilities, or
utilities.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33031 (1997):
(a) This subdivision describes physical conditions that cause blight:
(1) Buildings in which it is unsafe or unhealthy for persons to live
or work. These conditions can be caused by serious building code
violations, dilapidation and deterioration, defective design or
physical construction, faulty or inadequate utilities, or other similar
factors.
(2) Factors that prevent or substantially hinder the economically
viable use or capacity of buildings or lots. This condition can be
caused by a substandard design, inadequate size given present
standards and market conditions, lack of parking, or other similar
factors.
(3) Adjacent or nearby uses that are incompatible with each other
and which prevent the economic development of those parcels or
other portions of the project area.
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(4) The existence of subdivided lots of irregular form and shape
and inadequate size for proper usefulness and development that are
in multiple ownership.
(b) This subdivision describes economic conditions that cause
blight:
(1) Depreciated or stagnant property values or impaired
investments, including, but not necessarily limited to, those
properties containing hazardous wastes that require the use of
agency authority as specified in Article 12.5 (commencing with
Section 33459).
(2) Abnormally high business vacancies, abnormally low lease
rates, high turnover rates, abandoned buildings, or excessive vacant
lots within an area developed for urban use and served by utilities.
(3) A lack of necessary commercial facilities that are normally
found in neighborhoods, including grocery stores, drug stores, and
banks and other lending institutions.
(4) Residential overcrowding or an excess of bars, liquor stores, or
other businesses that cater exclusively to adults, that has led to
problems of public safety and welfare.
(5) A high crime rate that constitutes a serious threat to the public
safety and welfare.
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